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Executive summary
With the conclusion of the Brexit transition period on  
31 December 2020, the free movement of people between 
the 27 member states of the EU and Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland; and the UK has come to 
an end. Some of the millions of EU nationals in the UK 
and British nationals in the EU are already suffering the 
consequences of this drastic curtailment of rights.
The present moment is propitious to explore ways to 
govern and facilitate migration between the two parties. 
Although an EU-wide agreement with the UK that 
ensures free movement remains the ideal solution, it 
is currently unrealistic. This calls for an evaluation of 
possible alternatives. 
Considering the importance of migration flows in 
both directions, this Discussion Paper investigates the 
possibility of adopting bilateral agreements on the free 
movement of people. It analyses various bilateral free 
movement agreements across Europe to show that their 
use is not only legal but also habitual. This analysis 
highlights the flexibility offered by bilateral agreements 
and the different forms they take when it comes to the 
rights of entry, residency and work, as well as other 
important rights (e.g. family reunion, social security, 
voting rights). 
This Discussion Paper considers Spain as the first 
possible candidate for a post-Brexit bilateral free 
movement agreement concluded between an EU member 
state and the UK. Spain is the most important EU 
destination for British emigrants, and British migrants 
residing in Spain constitute the latter’s third-largest 
non-national population. In turn, the UK is the most 
important migrant destination for Spanish nationals 
worldwide, who represent the fifth-largest migrant group 
from the EU. The author investigates the present legal 
statuses of UK nationals in Spain, and Spanish – and 
EU nationals more generally – in the UK. He then offers 
suggestions as to what a bilateral treaty between Spain 
and the UK could include.
Bilateral agreements on the free movement of people 
are legal from international, EU and domestic law 
perspectives. Admittedly, there could be political 
impediments to their adoption, especially if EU 
institutions or member states pressure individual 
European governments not to follow this route, even 
though migration law on this matter is a national 
competence. Nevertheless, bilateral agreements could 
mitigate the impact of the loss of free movement rights. 
Therefore, some member states might be keen to follow 
this road due to specific social, economic and/or political 
concerns; and strong migration flows. 
Bilateral agreements should be explored and examined 
as a possible alternative to an EU-wide agreement with 
the UK to facilitate and govern cross-border mobility. 
In negotiating bilateral agreements, the UK and EU 
countries should take the pre-Brexit status quo as the 
starting point and incorporate a number of provisions on 
entry, stay, rights during residency, and protection from 
expulsion. They could then be adapted to the particular 
needs and interests of the countries at hand. Such 
bilateral agreements could also be used as a foundation 
upon which to build an agreement between the EU as a 
whole and the UK, if not to facilitate the rebuilding of 
mutual trust.
The following recommendations are targeted at the 
governments of EU member states that have important 
reciprocal migration flows with the UK, as well as the UK 
government. They should be considered to explore the 
possibility of adopting bilateral agreements on migration 
between certain EU member states and the UK.
q  Bilateral agreements should be examined as a possible 
alternative to an EU-wide agreement with the UK to 
facilitate and govern cross-border mobility between 
the two parties. 
q  The negotiating parties should place the rights and 
interests of both short-term and long-term British and 
European nationals residing in each other’s territory at 
the centre stage.
q  In negotiating a possible treaty, both the respective EU 
member state (e.g. Spain) and the UK should take the 
pre-Brexit status quo as the departing point. 
q  The status of mobile nationals could be improved 
beyond that enjoyed by EU citizens pre-Brexit. For 
example, political rights could be extended beyond the 
municipal level.
q  Certain categories of individuals (e.g. retirees, young 
workers) could benefit from special provisions which 
also depart from the pre-Brexit situation.
q  Bilateral agreements should be aimed at gradually 
rebuilding mutual trust between the EU and the 
UK. They should be used as a model for a future 
arrangement with the EU as a whole.
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Introduction
On 31 December 2020, the transition period following the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU elapsed, marking an end to 
the free movement of people between the two parties. 
The negative consequences of this sudden curtailment of 
rights are already evident. For example, UK nationals have 
been refused entry into EU member states, including the 
Netherlands, Spain and Germany, on the basis that the UK 
is no longer exempted from EU-agreed, COVID-19-related 
travel restrictions. Likewise, so-called ‘swallows’ – UK 
nationals who spend winter in Spain and return to the 
UK in summer – have been prevented from visiting their 
second homes on a similar basis. In turn, EU jobseekers 
travelling to the UK for job interviews have been denied 
entry and, in some cases, even detained for days before 
being expelled.
A free movement agreement between the EU and the 
UK would carry some attractive advantages, as it would 
benefit all EU citizens and allow British nationals to travel 
and settle anywhere in the Union. However, signing such 
an EU-wide agreement is currently unrealistic. Indeed, 
ending free movement was one of the central elements 
of the Brexit campaign and debate, which presented 
immigration to the UK as “out of control” and thus 
pushed the rhetoric that it must “take back control of its 
borders”.1 In 2020, the UK’s National Centre for Social 
Research found that 62% of UK respondents believed that 
EU immigrants should have to apply to come to the UK 
rather than enjoy free movement.2  
A free movement agreement  
between the EU and the UK would  
carry some attractive advantages. 
However, signing such an EU-wide 
agreement is currently unrealistic.
Moreover, Labour leader Keir Starmer made a U-turn in 
January 2021, declaring that he will not be looking to 
reinstate free movement rights should he win the next 
national election, as he had previously promised. Free 
movement is not a palatable option for the Conservative 
Party, either. Due to the UK’s two-party political system, 
that the other prominent political groups – the Liberal 
Democrats, the Scottish National Party, the Green Party 
– support free movement does not hold much weight. 
Negotiations on an agreement between the EU as a whole 
and the UK in the near future are therefore highly unlikely. 
This is the opportune moment to discuss alternatives 
to the regulation of migration between the two parties. 
One option would be to adopt bilateral free movement 
agreements between the UK and individual EU countries, 
which could mitigate the impact of the loss of mobility 
rights. In fact, British nationals have seen their work, 
study and life choices curtailed dramatically, decreasing 
the value of the British passport significantly.3 In a 2019 
European Commission survey, 55% of UK respondents 
stated that they had benefited from no or minor border 
controls when travelling abroad.4 
In the absence of an EU-wide agreement, bilateral ones 
would make it possible to preserve some core rights for 
certain EU nationals wishing to move to the UK while 
also meeting the expectations of the UK public. Moreover, 
bilateral treaties are not at all uncommon; they are 
in force in Europe and beyond. This Discussion Paper 
analyses various accords from across Europe to highlight 
the flexibility they offer and the different forms they take 
when it comes to the rights of entry, residency and work, 
as well as other important rights (e.g. family reunion, 
social security, voting rights).
Spain should be the first candidate for a post-Brexit 
bilateral treaty concluded between the UK and an EU 
member state. Spain is the most important EU destination 
for British emigrants and the fourth most important 
globally after Australia, the US and Canada.5 
As of December 2020, 381,448 British migrants were 
residing in Spain, making it the third-largest migrant 
population after Romanian and Moroccan nationals.6 
According to some estimates, if short-term British 
migrants are included (e.g. those who only spend a number 
of months in Spain each year), the total could reach a 
million.7 In turn, the UK is the most important migrant 
destination globally for Spanish nationals.8 Roughly 
185,000 Spanish nationals were living in the UK in 2020, 
making it the fifth-largest migrant group from the EU.9 
In addition to these numbers, there are many more living 
between both countries: the aforementioned seasonal UK 
‘swallows’, or Spanish youths working and/or studying for 
several months in cities like London and Edinburgh and 
who have been referred to as “transmigrants”.10 Moreover, 
Spain and the UK have already signed a reciprocal 
agreement to secure the right of their respective citizens  
to vote and stand in local elections.  
As of December 2020, 381,448 British 
migrants were residing in Spain, making it 
the third-largest migrant population after 
Romanian and Moroccan nationals.
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Section 1 of this Discussion Paper assesses the new, 
post-Brexit immigration system between the EU and 
the UK. Spain is used as a case study to showcase British 
nationals’ difficulties in obtaining residency in an EU 
member state. Section 2 analyses several bilateral 
agreements already adopted in Europe to highlight 
the diversity in their origins and clauses. This section 
also investigates the possibility for Spain and the UK 
to draw up a bilateral agreement and the provisions 
it could include. The paper concludes by offering 
recommendations for the governments of EU member 
states that have important reciprocal migration flows 
with the UK, as well as the UK government.
1. The new post-Brexit immigration system 
between the EU and the UK
1.1. THE LEGAL STATUS OF EU NATIONALS  
IN THE UK
The free movement of UK nationals to EU member states, 
barring Ireland, ended on 31 December 2020 with the 
expiration of the Brexit transition period. A new system 
was also brought into force for EU immigrants wishing to 
come to the UK. By June 2020, an estimated 3.45 million 
EU nationals lived in the UK.11 Their legal status now 
depends on whether they meet the new criteria under the 
EU Settlement Scheme, contained in the Appendix EU to 
the UK’s Immigration Rules. Those who entered the UK 
before the cut-off date of 31 December 2020 are covered 
by the Withdrawal Agreement and can obtain ‘pre-settled’ 
or ‘settled’ status, depending on their circumstances. The 
former is granted to EU, European Economic Area (EEA) 
or Swiss nationals who have lived in the UK for less than 
five years. This status gives a person the right to live 
and work in the UK for five years. They can spend up to 
two years outside of the UK without losing this status. 
2,099,200 applicants had been granted pre-settled status 
as of 28 February 2021.12 
In turn, settled status can be obtained by EU nationals 
who have lived in the UK for five continuous years and 
can prove that they have spent at least six months of 
each of those years physically in the UK. In addition to all 
the rights of pre-settled status, they can live and work in 
the UK indefinitely, bring certain family members if the 
family relationship began by 31 December 2020,13 and 
live outside of the UK for up to five years in a row without 
losing their status. 2,553,900 people had been granted 
settled status as of 28 February 2021.14 
Finally, there is no special treatment for those living 
between an EU member state and the UK. As mentioned, 
EU, EEA, and Swiss nationals can only apply for  
(pre-)settled status if they were in the UK on or before  
31 December 2020 and must apply by 30 June 2021. 
Those EU, EEA and Swiss nationals arriving in the UK from 
1 January 2021 must now follow the standard immigration 
routes under the new points-based immigration system. 
They can travel to the UK for holidays and short trips of up 
to six months with a valid passport and without needing a 
visa, but do not have the right to work during that period. 
Anyone entering the UK to work must obtain a number 
of points based on certain requirements. To be granted a 
Skilled Worker visa, the applicant must have a job offer 
from an approved employer sponsor, speak English and be 
offered an annual salary of at least £25,600. The applicant 
may be offered a lower annual salary (but no less than 
£20,480) if, for example, they hold a job offer from an 
industry listed as a shortage occupation or hold a PhD 
degree relevant to the job. In turn, the Global Talent visa 
scheme allows applicants who have “exceptional talent or 
exceptional promise” in the fields of science, engineering, 
humanities, medicine, digital technology, or arts and 
culture to come to the UK without a job offer.15 However, 
an organisation approved by the Home Office must 
endorse and confirm that the applicant is a (potential 
future) leader in said field. 
In addition to these paths to obtain residency, the student 
visa route allows a successful applicant to study in the 
UK if they have already been offered a place on a course, 
are fluent in English and are financially self-sufficient. 
Once they conclude their studies, the new graduate 
immigration route, which opens on 1 July 2021, will allow 
international students who have completed a degree in 
the UK to (seek) work in the UK, at any skill level, for up 
to two years, or three in the case of PhD graduates. 
Thus, for the first time in decades, the UK is treating 
newly arrived EU nationals the same as any other 
immigrant. The impact of this new points-based system 
is yet to be seen, as it has so far run concurrently to 
the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has had its own 
unprecedented impact on immigration patterns. However, 
the Institute for Public Policy Research argues that 
“there is likely to be lower levels of immigration from 
EU countries under the new immigration system”, as 
“around 63 per cent of EU-born workers currently living 
in the UK (excluding the self-employed) would not be 
eligible for the skilled worker route.”16 This is because 
the occupations covered by the ‘skilled worker’ route do 
not generally match the type of jobs that EU nationals 
are currently performing in the UK.17 This is likely to put 
pressure on sectors that are highly reliant on EU workers 
and lead to a rise in informal employment.18 
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1.2. THE LEGAL STATUS OF BRITISH 
NATIONALS IN THE EU
The situation faced by British nationals wishing to 
move to an EU country must be considered in order 
to understand how their legal status has changed 
post-Brexit. What follows is a specific analysis of the 
immigration rules that govern UK nationals’ position  
in Spain.
Title II of the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement set 
out the legal status of UK nationals and their family 
members residing in other EU states until the end of 
the transitional period, namely 31 December 2020.19 
UK nationals residing in Spain before that date could 
register to obtain a Spanish identity card, the Tarjeta de 
Identidad de Extranjero (TIE), which would confirm their 
rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. However, those 
who had already registered their residency before 6 July 
2020 would have obtained a Green Residence Certificate 
in paper format, which proves their rights under the 
Withdrawal Agreement, and could be exchanged for a TIE 
if desired. Family members with whom a bond existed 
before 1 January 2021, whether British or third-country 
nationals (TCNs) (including any future children), can also 
obtain residency. 
The TIE is valid for five years for those who have not 
resided in the country for more than five years. Those 
with a longer residency will have obtained a permanent 
TIE that is valid for ten years. The former temporary TIE 
can be upgraded to a permanent one after the five years 
of residency. The Withdrawal Agreement outlines that the 
rights of such UK nationals to residency, work, education 
and social security services in their respective EU host 
country are retained beyond the transitional period, as per 
the application of EU law.20 
UK nationals and their family members (whether UK or 
TCNs) who arrive in Spain after 1 January 2021 do not fall 
under the Withdrawal Agreement. Instead, they are subject 
to the regular Spanish immigration rules applicable to any 
TCN by the Law on Foreigners (Ley de Extranjería). While no 
visa is required for short stays, up to 90 days within any 180-
day period, a visa must be obtained for all other purposes, 
including longer stays, residency and work. UK nationals 
will have to follow the same procedures as any other TCN. 
In general, obtaining a work permit in Spain is only 
possible in certain limited occupations or when no 
suitable Spaniard, EU national or TCN already residing 
in Spain is available. Those willing to reside in Spain 
without exercising any economic activity have, in general, 
two available paths: prove a monthly income of at least 
€2,250, or purchase a property worth at least €500,000. 
There are additional requirements in both cases, such as 
having health insurance. Family members may also join by 
fulfilling other conditions. 
While Brits and Spaniards will continue to be allowed 
short-term visits to each other’s states under the 
Withdrawal Agreement, they are no longer entitled to 
long-term residency, work, retirement, education nor 
sponsoring of family members. The most recent data 
shows that 22% of UK nationals living in Spain are 
working, while 48% are retired and 11% are unemployed. 
The remainder is made up of those too young to work, 
students and the economically inactive.21 
While Brits and Spaniards will continue to 
be allowed short-term visits to each other’s 
states under the Withdrawal Agreement, 
they are no longer entitled to long-term 
residency, work, retirement, education  
nor sponsoring of family members.
Consequently, in the absence of a bilateral agreement – or 
an agreement with the EU as a whole –, the lack of mobility 
opportunities between the EU and the UK demand urgent 
thinking. Indeed, under the new, post-Brexit rules, 
thousands of individuals will be affected by, for example, 
much stricter family reunion rules and the lack of paths for 
labour mobility. Likewise, industries will find it hard to fill 
labour shortages, a concern that has already been raised by 
UK employers in numerous sectors, including hospitality, 
construction and transport.22
2. Analysis of current bilateral agreements, and a 
proposal for a new one
This section analyses the bilateral agreement between 
the EU and Switzerland, among many others across 
Europe, examining their specific features and assessing 
whether they could be used as an alternative model for a 
relationship between certain EU member states and the 
UK. Many other countries at the international level have, 
or have had, bilateral agreements on the free movement 
of people: the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Russia 
and Belarus, Australia and New Zealand, Brazil and 
Argentina, India and Nepal. Thus, bilateral agreements 
on the free movement of people are a regular occurrence 






Bilateral agreements on the free 
movement of people are a regular 
occurrence at the global level and  
are worth exploring in the present,  
post-Brexit context.
 
2.1. THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM
The Common Travel Area (CTA) is a special travel zone 
between the Republic of Ireland (Ireland) and the United 
Kingdom, Isle of Man and Channel Islands (UK), dating 
back to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922. 
Its adoption resulted from the unsuitability, from the 
point of view of the UK Home Office, of establishing a 
passport system between the UK and Ireland, and the 
preference to maintain the status quo between the two 
territories.23 Subsequently, Irish and UK nationals had 
their privileges enshrined in domestic law, which granted 
them a special status in each other’s territories and 
free movement across the two countries. Ireland is not 
considered a ‘foreign country’ for the purpose of UK laws, 
and Irish nationals are not considered ‘aliens’. Similarly, 
while treated differently from Irish citizens, UK nationals 
in Ireland are explicitly exempt from restrictions on entry 
and residency, and the possibility of deportation except in 
some limited cases.24
Successive governments in both Ireland and the UK 
have supported the CTA for a number of reasons. First, 
it is believed to be “impractical for the Irish border to 
be an immigration frontier” because of the difficulty of 
policing it.25 Second, the social and economic connections 
between Ireland and the UK, including their shared 
use of the English language, as well as a high level of 
trade, cultural, social and political links, have often 
been highlighted.26 Third, the free movement of labour 
is supported consistently by both states and benefits 
workers moving in both directions.27 According to official 
statistics, approximately 364,000 Irish nationals lived  
in the UK in 2020,28 and 103,100 UK nationals in Ireland 
in 2016.29
In light of Brexit, a 2019 Memorandum of Understanding 
reaffirmed the status that Irish and UK nationals enjoy in 
each other’s territory and guarantees that there will be 
no changes to these rights. While it is “not […] intended 
to create legally binding obligations”,30 it does reflect the 
mutual commitment towards this arrangement. Under the 
CTA, Irish and UK nationals are not subject to passport 
checks when travelling between the two states, although 
passports may still need to be presented to confirm Irish or 
UK nationality at air and sea borders. Despite both states 
maintaining their own visa and immigration policies, there 
is a great degree of policy coordination and cooperation.
Irish and UK nationals are free to enter and remain 
in either country without requiring any form of visa, 
residency or employment permit. The only exception is 
Irish nationals subject to a deportation order, exclusion 
decision or international travel ban, and who must apply 
for permission to enter the UK. Irish and UK nationals are 
permitted to work in either country, including on a self-
employed basis. Both states are committed to ensuring 
that professional qualifications are recognised across the 
CTA. Nationals from both states have the right to access 
all levels of education, as well as qualify for student loans 
for higher education. Furthermore, they can access social 
security benefits and entitlements, including pensions, 
healthcare, social housing and homeless assistance. 
In their capacity as Commonwealth citizens, Irish 
nationals can vote in local and national parliamentary 
elections and referendums in the UK. UK nationals in 
Ireland can also vote in local and general elections, 
but not in national referendums nor European 
parliamentary elections.
2.2. ANDORRA, SPAIN AND FRANCE; ANDORRA 
AND PORTUGAL
Other bilateral agreements involve EU member states and 
microstates, often neighbouring ones. The Principality 
of Andorra represents an interesting case study of a 
microstate that has concluded two bilateral agreements 
on the free movement of persons with three EU countries: 
France, Spain and Portugal. Monaco and San Marino have, 
in turn, ratified treaties with France and Italy, respectively.
The agreement between Andorra, Spain and France 
was concluded in 2000. It is based on the geographical 
location of Andorra, the historical links between these 
states and their good neighbourly relations.31 Recent 
immigration figures prove these strong bonds. By 2020, 
out of the 78,015 residents in Andorra, 19,211 were 
Spaniards and 3,423 were French.32 In turn, the agreement 
with Portugal, adopted in 2007, was based on “the desire 
to maintain the quality of existing relations, favourable 
to their respective nationals”.33 Portuguese nationals 
represent the second-largest immigrant community in 
Andorra, with 2020 figures at 9,083.34
The two agreements are practically identical, with the 
primary purpose of “facilitating both the movement 
and the establishment of [their respective] nationals”.35 
The right to enter and stay for periods not exceeding 90 
days is granted upon the presentation of a valid identity 
card. Beyond this period, the individual must obtain 
a residency permit in accordance with national law. 
Those individuals willing to establish residency “without 
engaging in gainful activities” must provide evidence of 
sufficient economic means and sickness, maternity and 
accident insurance cover. This makes the conditions of 
residency for such individuals slightly stricter than those 
that apply for EU nationals under the Citizens’ Rights 
Directive 2004/38.36 
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In terms of rights, Andorrans enjoy a very similar 
treatment in France, Spain, and Portugal as EU citizens, 
while French, Spanish and Portuguese nationals are 
offered a privileged status in Andorra. Moreover, both 
agreements enshrine some provisions on labour rights, 
as well as incorporate the right to family reunification.37 
Lastly, those individuals “legally residing” in the territory 
of another State Party may be expelled “only on grounds 
of public policy, public security or public health, in 
accordance with the legislation of the host State”.38 
In terms of rights, Andorrans enjoy a very 
similar treatment in France, Spain, and 
Portugal as EU citizens, while French, 
Spanish and Portuguese nationals are 
offered a privileged status in Andorra.
 
2.3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SWITZERLAND
The Swiss Confederation (Switzerland) is not, nor has it 
ever been, a member of the EU. Switzerland is also not 
a member of the EEA. However, Switzerland is part of 
the Schengen Area, which removes passport checks at 
internal border points while ensuring common safety 
measures at external borders. 
On 20 May 1992, Switzerland applied for EU membership.39 
That same year, however, Swiss nationals rejected by 
referendum the option to join the EEA, thus making EU 
membership impossible as well.40 At that point in time, 
the urgent need for agreements between the EU and 
Switzerland became apparent. In fact, the EU appealed for 
this specifically to secure the rights of many EU nationals 
living in or commuting daily to Switzerland from 
neighbouring EU member states.41 
The negotiations that followed resulted in seven 
agreements, one of which was the Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons (AFMP), which entered into 
force on 1 June 2002. The AFMP places Swiss nationals 
on a similar, but not equal, footing with EU nationals 
in terms of their rights to enter, work, reside (also for 
the economically inactive), bring family members, 
have their qualifications recognised and be protected 
from expulsion.42 The negotiations for the agreement’s 
conclusion were conducted between the EU and 
Switzerland as two equal partners, as opposed to between 
several EU countries on the one hand and Switzerland on 
the other. Every time the EU is enlarged, the agreement 
is extended to include the new member state through an 
additional protocol.43 The opposite is equally true, with 
the UK leaving the EU being a case in point. 
2.4. PROSPECTS FOR A BILATERAL AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE UK AND SELECTED EU 
COUNTRIES
The previous sections show that, although an agreement 
with the EU as a whole may be possible in specific 
circumstances, bilateral agreements provide an alternative 
model and practical solutions to questions relating 
to mobility between EU countries and the UK. More 
specifically, these agreements show that it is possible 
to cover a variety of civil, social, economic and even 
political rights while simultaneously allowing states to 
set additional conditions for moving and settling abroad. 
Indeed, while bilateral agreements can be replicated – as 
in the case of Andorra –, they can also be unique and 
include different provisions depending on the migration 
flows and their characteristics between two states. 
Under current domestic and international law, both 
individual EU member states and the UK can legally 
conclude bilateral free movement agreements with each 
other. From an EU law point of view, migration must 
also be differentiated from trade. While bilateral free 
trade agreements do fall under the scope of the Union’s 
common commercial policy, over which the EU has an 
exclusive mandate, immigration is an area of shared 
competence in the EU.44 
A bilateral agreement would therefore only need to 
respect what is already established in the EU directives 
that regulate entry and residency of particular TCN 
categories (e.g. highly skilled workers). Nevertheless, 
it could also go beyond their provisions – a possibility 
enshrined in said directives.45 The bilateral agreements 
explored in the previous sections also validate this point. 
However, the visa policy for Schengen states is regulated 
at the EU level and requires reciprocity.46 Hence, the UK 
cannot introduce visa requirements for particular EU 
nationalities and then expect that British nationals can 
travel visa-free to all EU member states. 
Bilateral agreements would also bring 
some disadvantages. Most obviously, they 
would benefit nationals of only one EU 
member state in the UK and not others.
Bilateral agreements would also bring some 
disadvantages. Most obviously, they would benefit 
nationals of only one EU member state in the UK and 
not others. The UK may only be willing, if at all, to sign 
agreements with countries where a large number of British 
nationals reside already. These include not just Spain but 
also France and Portugal, and omit member states like 
Poland or Romania. Likewise, many EU countries could be 
uninterested in negotiating such agreements due to the 
limited migration flows in both directions, such as Austria.
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Although the adoption of bilateral agreements would 
be better for hundreds of thousands of Europeans than 
no agreement at all, from a political point of view, the 
situation is more complex. In its recent conclusions from 
its meeting between 24 and 25 May 2021, the European 
Council affirmed that “a non-member of the EU cannot 
enjoy the same benefits as a member and that the 
relationship must be based on a balance of rights and 
obligations at all times.” It then followed by calling on the 
“UK to respect the principle of non-discrimination among 
Member States.”47 With such a statement, the European 
Council seems to caution individual member states not 
to be seduced by the possibility of adopting bilateral 
agreements that would also inevitably lead to a difference 
in treatment between Union nationals residing in the UK.  
 
Accordingly, some or even most EU countries may be 
uninterested in engaging in a bilateral negotiation on such 
a sensitive issue with the UK, taking into account the wider 
political context of Brexit. However, the example of the 
agreements with Andorra clearly shows that while it might 
be politically difficult and/or costly to be the first member 
state to adopt a treaty with the UK, strictly speaking, there 
is no legal impediment to take such a step. The EU should 
therefore respect the division of competences on this 
sensitive matter. It cannot be forgotten, either, that the 
EU institutions have not indicated any need for Ireland to 
withdraw its special relationship with the UK. The same 
possibility should be open to other member states based 
on not only their respective migration flows but also other 
factors, such as the economic consequences of the lack of 
mobility rules post-Brexit.  
Some or even most EU countries may be 
uninterested in engaging in a bilateral 
negotiation on such a sensitive issue 
with the UK, taking into account the 
wider political context of Brexit. The EU 
should therefore respect the division of 
competences on this sensitive matter.
Although bilateral agreements could create frictions 
between EU and UK institutions, and even among EU 
member states, the adoption of bilateral treaties should 
be seen in a different light. With the toxic legacy of the 
Brexit process, the current political climate in Europe 
makes it harder to imagine the swift re-establishment of 
comprehensive mobility rules between the EU and the UK. 
As such, bilateral agreements could be the first stepping 
stone to their gradual reintroduction. They could even be 
the foundation for building a future arrangement with the 
EU as a whole. 
Such progressiveness is not unheard of at the global level. 
In South America, Argentina signed numerous bilateral 
agreements on the free movement of people with regional 
neighbours in the late 1990s and early 2000s before a 
multilateral agreement came into place. In our case, a 
future EU-wide agreement could build on the restored 
trust contributed to by bilateral relations and even be 
modelled on the terms of the bilateral agreements. The 
AFMP could be useful, although, of course, a more modest 
model could be adopted, at least initially, with only 
certain categories (e.g. workers) allowed mobility. 
Drawing on successful bilateral relations, a future UK 
government may also be more inclined to reconsider its 
immigration approach and include exceptions to its new 
points-based system for at least some categories of EU 
nationals (e.g. those economically active, in short-term 
contracts). While there are no obvious paths to follow 
in the present circumstances, bilateral agreements 
constitute a useful tool that could become part of the 
equation to solve the lack of mobility arrangements 
between the EU and the UK. 
2.5. THE SCOPE OF A POSSIBLE FUTURE 
BILATERAL AGREEMENT
This Discussion Paper advocates that the status quo 
established in the Withdrawal Agreement represents 
the departing point for any future bilateral agreement 
between EU member states and the UK. This would allow 
for an easier transition from the pre-Brexit situation 
and reinstatement of the former rights in terms of entry, 
residency, work and study. Accordingly, an agreement 
between both Spain and the UK should, first and foremost, 
provide the same rights to both parties and establish 
perfect reciprocity. While bilateral agreements that 
privilege the rights of one party’s nationals do exist 
in both Europe (e.g. Andorra–Spain) and globally (e.g. 
Australia–New Zealand),48 this would be difficult to accept 
in the present context. Once this first point is settled, the 
content can be negotiated with greater flexibility.  
The status quo established in the 
Withdrawal Agreement represents the 
departing point for any future bilateral 




A Spain–UK bilateral agreement would be mostly 
concerned with four elements: entry, stay, rights during 
residency, and protection from expulsion.
When it comes to entry, the agreement should offer 
this right to a large as possible group of individuals. In 
line with EU law, those posing a threat based on certain 
established provisos could be denied entry. In that regard, 
jobseekers should also be offered a sufficiently long 
period to join the labour market. 
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Regarding stay, this could follow EU norms already 
in place so that workers, including the self-employed, 
students and the economically inactive, can be granted 
residency permits. In line with the Citizens’ Rights 
Directive, there could be more stringent requirements, 
such as health insurance, for those who enter to study 
or reside without exercising an economic activity, in 
line with what is established in the Andorra–Spain 
agreement. Students could be treated as nationals in 
each other’s territory when it comes to fees, loans and 
scholarships, as is the case under the CTA between 
Ireland and the UK. Finally, both countries could 
establish certain professions that only nationals can 
access or in which they enjoy a preference. 
A flexible approach could also be used to, for example, 
recognise the high number of UK retirees in Spain by 
removing the requirement for UK nationals to invest half 
a million euros to gain residency rights. Similarly, the 
UK could recognise the significant number of Spanish 
nationals who move to the UK to work by removing the 
requirement of employment sponsorship and the general 
salary threshold.49 Considering that British nationals 
constitute the largest number of foreign property 
investors in Spain,50 provisions adapted to such a reality 
could be established.
Regarding rights during residency, a general clause 
of equal treatment with nationals that includes certain 
exceptions could be the departing point. A particularly 
thorny issue would be the regulation of family reunion. 
Before the end of the transition period, UK nationals had 
to comply with stricter conditions to bring their non-
EU family members to the UK than EU, EEA and Swiss 
citizens living in the UK. It is thus unlikely that a bilateral 
agreement could offer Spanish nationals the family 
reunion rights they had before Brexit. Regardless, and in 
line with the principle of reciprocity advocated for earlier, 
the conditions for family reunion should be the same in 
both territories. 
To provide certainty, other elements like social security 
could follow the provisions established in the Withdrawal 
Agreement. Access to healthcare should be granted under 
the general clause of equal treatment. Other aspects 
– such as social housing, which is included in the CTA – 
could be the subject of discussion and be left out of its 
scope should no agreement be reached. 
With reference to political rights, Spain and the UK already 
signed a separate reciprocal agreement in 2019 to secure 
the right of their respective citizens to vote and stand in 
local elections. The UK government has highlighted the 
importance of this agreement as a positive step forward in 
its bilateral relationship with Spain, and similar reciprocal 
voting agreements have since been concluded with 
Portugal, Luxembourg and Poland. 
Finally, regarding protection from expulsion, the 
agreement could include similar provisions to those 
already established in the EU–Switzerland agreement. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The UK withdrawal from the EU has led to a drastic loss 
of rights for millions of EU and British citizens, including 
free movement. This calls for an evaluation of possible 
alternatives. Although adopting a free movement 
agreement between the entire EU and the UK – similar 
to the former’s agreement with Switzerland – would be 
desirable, this option is not politically viable. At least, 
not in the present context. While also politically difficult 
in the present scenario, multiple bilateral agreements 
between the UK and individual member states could offer 
a more realistic solution to those EU countries with large 
migration flows to and from the UK.  
Although adopting a free movement 
agreement between the entire EU and  
the UK – similar to the former’s 
agreement with Switzerland – would be 
desirable, this option is not politically 
viable. At least, not in the present context.
European institutions should acknowledge that bilateral 
agreements on the free movement of people are currently 
in use, both in Europe and elsewhere, and are aligned 
with EU law. They should also respect member states’ 
competence on this sensitive matter. In the meantime, 
bilateral agreements could be used to remodel the former 
free movement regime between the EU as a whole and the 
UK, gradually rebuilding trust between the two parts.  
 
Thus, the following recommendations are targeted to the 
governments of EU member states that have important 
reciprocal migration flows with the UK, as well as to the 
government of the UK. They should be considered to 
explore the possibility of adopting bilateral agreements on 
migration between certain EU member states and the UK.
q  Bilateral agreements should be examined as a possible 
alternative to an EU-wide agreement with the UK to 
facilitate and govern cross-border mobility between the 
two parties. 
q  The negotiating parties should place the rights and 
interests of both short-term and long-term British and 
European nationals residing in each other’s territory at 
the centre stage.
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q  In negotiating a possible treaty, both the respective EU 
member state (e.g. Spain) and the UK should take the 
pre-Brexit status quo as the departing point. 
q  The status of mobile nationals could be improved 
beyond that enjoyed by EU citizens before Brexit. For 
example, political rights could be extended beyond the 
municipal level.
q  Certain categories of individuals (e.g. retirees, young 
workers) could benefit from special provisions which 
also depart from the pre-Brexit situation.
q  Bilateral agreements should be aimed at rebuilding 
mutual trust gradually between the EU and the UK. They 
should be used as a model for a future arrangement with 
the EU as a whole.
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